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RECENT CASES
Divorce-Abandonment-Military Service-On January 15, 1943,
defendant husband abandoned plaintiff wife, stating that he was tired of
her and never again would live with her. Three months later he was
inducted into the United States Navy. Subsequently, while still in the
service, but on liberty, he met her and told her that he had no change of
heart and would not live with her should she be "the last woman on earth."
In February of 1944, plaintiff instituted an action seeking divorce on the
ground of one year's abandonment. The court dismissed her petition ruling
that the absence of defendant from the plaintiff after the former's induction
was not voluntary on his part. Upon appeal, reversing the judgment of
the lower court, held, induction into the armed forces within a year after
wilful desertion of a spouse does not necessarily preclude the granting of
a divorce on the ground of one year's abandonment. Graham v. Graham,
299 Ky. 543, 186 S. W. (2d) 186 (1945).
An interesting situation which may become the subject of much future
litigation and which is almost without precedent' appears in the instant
case. Desertion, or abandonment, as a ground for divorce entails voluntary
abandonment without cause plus intention to desert and to make such deser-
tion permanent for the duration of the statutory period, together with the
requirement that the abandonment must be against the will of the deserted
spouse.2 The defendant in the instant case abandoned the plaintiff against
her will. His intention to abandon clearly remained the same while he
was in the service. The case under discussion is unlike the line of cases
in which courts uniformly have held that intervening insanity tolls the
running of the period of desertion." That holding is based on the theory
that the deserting spouse, being non compos mentis, is denied the statutory
period extended for the purpose of giving him that time to reconsider and
reestablish marital relations. The effect of military service should be gov-
erned by analogy to principles which apply where the deserting spouse is
imprisoned during the statutory period.4 Cases of this kind, although not
in full accord, tend to sustain the view that the time spent in prison is to
be included in determining the duration of the abandonment.5 It is not
I. For dearly analogous situations see Margulies v. Margulies, 92 N. J. Eq. 332, 112
Atl. 484 (192o) ; Mack v. Mack, 32 Del. Co. Rep. 246 (Pa. 1944) ; Dewell v. Dewell,
69 Pitts. L. J. 384 (Pa. 1920) ; Hutcheson v. Hutcheson, Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 23,
1945, P. I, col. I (Fayette Co., Pa. 1945).
2. 2 SCHoULFI,, MARRIAGF DIVoRcE, SEPARATION AND DosTic RELATIONS (6th
ed. 1921) § 1615.
1 3. Messick v. Messick, 177 Ky. 337, 197 S. W. 792 (i9o8) ; Kirkpatrick v. Kirk-
patrick, 81 Neb. 627, 116 N. W. 499 (19o8) ; Gordon v. Gordon, 89 N. J. Eq. 535, 105
Atl. 242 (1918) ; Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215 N. C. 685, 3 S. E. (2d) 5 (1939) ; Little
v. Little, 56 Pa. Super. 419 (1914) ; Wright v. Wright, 125 Va. 526, 99 S. E. 515
(1919).
4. The close analogy is drawn by virtue of the fact that physical restraint is the
only element which could possibly toll the running of the statutory period of desertion.
5. Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168 (1897) ; Hews v. Hews, 73 Mass.
279 (1856) ; Liberato v. Liberato, 38 A. (2d) 88o (N. H. 1944). Contra: Truman v.
Truman, 6 Harr. i55, 171 Atl. 453 (Del. Super. 1934) ; Porritt v. Porritt, IS Mich. 42o
(1869) ; Hyland v. Hyland, 55 N. J. Eq. 35, 36 Atl. 270 (1896) ; Bechtel v. Bechtel,
IS Dist. 1076 (Pa. 19o8) (flight from the jurisdiction to avoid arrest) ; Shannon v.
Shannon, 7 Dist. 552 (Pa. 1898). It is consequential to take cognizance of the fact that
in cases of imprisonment, even though the defendant was involuntarily restrained from
rejoining the offended spouse, such restraint occurred as a result of past acts for which
the punishment by imprisoning is inflicted and thus making the abandonment, to a cer-
tain extent, voluntary.
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logical to conclude either that because the defendant was involuntarily
inducted into the service his mind was more likely to change than not or
that, by such induction, he was deprived of the necessary statutory period
in which to change his mind. Wilfulness and obstinacy are conditions of
the mind and, therefore, if constant for the statutory period after the
original abandoning, physical restraint of the deserter should be imma-
terial. There is no apparent reason why the wife in this case should be
forced to remain faithful to a husband who had deserted her and continues
to remain aloof from her. If the purpose of the divorce statute is to be
fulfilled, it certainly seems that the court acted wisely by extending con-
trolling effect to the intention of the offending spouse.
Evidence-Admissibility of Hospital Records-Federal Shop
Book Act-Plaintiff's insured was found dead in Walter Reed General
Hospital under circumstances indicating possible suicide. Defendant, con-
testing a claim for double indemnity for accidental death, offered in evidence
original hospital records tending to show decedent's suicidal state of mind.
Included in the records were two neuropsychiatric reports in which dece-
dent had stated he wanted to die, and also the psychiatrist's diagnosis of
"psychoneurosis, hysteria, conversion type." On appeal, after rehearing,
held (one justice dissenting), hospital records based on opinion or conjec-
ture are not admissible under the Federal Shop Book Act exception to the
hearsay rule. To admit such entrieg would drastically impair the right of
cross-examination. Hospital records containing psychoneurotic diagnoses,
although systematically prepared for operations of the hospital, are not
entries made in the regular course of business under the Act. New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297 (App. D. C. 1945).
Although most courts have consistently held hospital records inad-
missible on common law principles,' some jurisdictions admit them as busi-
ness entries coming under the exception to the hearsay rule.2 Due to the
great confusion in the cases on the subject of business entries, a committee
of the Commonwealth Fund proposed a so-called model act to admit in
evidence regularly kept records and to abolish many of the cumbersome
common law restrictions.$ The model act was substantially adopted by
Congress.4 . Prior to the passage of the Act this same court had admitted
1. 6 W GmoF, EvIDmEcC (3d ed. 1940) § 1707. A few jurisdictions exclude all
such records as pure hearsay: McMahon v. Bangs, 5 Penne. 178, 62 Atl. IO93 (Del.
Super. 1904) ; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bell, 49 Ga. App. 640, 176
S. E. 124 (1934) ; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cox, 174 KIy. 683, 192 S. W.
636 (1917) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McSwain, 149 Miss. 455, 115 So. 555 (1928).
2. Boss v. Illinois Centr~al R. R., 221 Ill. App. 504 (1921) ; Globe Indemnity Co.
v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 Atl. 43 (1927) ; Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 4O,
183 N. E. 301 (1930); Ribas v. Revere Rubber Co., 37 R. I. i89, 91 Atl. 58 (1914);
Murgatroyd v. Dudley, 184 Wash. 222, 50 P. (2d) 1025 (1935).
3. See M ORGAN ET AL., THE LAw OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFOR-M
(1927) 51-63.
4. 49 STAT. 1561 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 695 (i94o). The statute provides:
"In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of
Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence,
or event, shall be admissible as evidence of said act, transaction, occurrence, or
event if it shall appear that it was made in the regular course of any business,
and that it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or
record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a rea-
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hospital records of the "opinions" as well as the "observations" of physi-
cians.' The court's decision in the instant case is in conflict with other
interpretations of the Act by various circuit courts of appeals.6 Moreover,
the states which have adopted the model act have demonstrated a much
more liberal tendency to admit diagnostic hospital records 7 than the court
in the instant case. The opinion rule would not seem to be violated by
admitting a physician's diagnosis because such diagnosis would ordinarily
be considered expert opinion." The majority opinion frankly admits that
under a literal interpretation of the Act, these hospital records would be
admissible.9 To sustain its decison it relies upon the test of admissibility
laid down by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman,10 i. e. "the char-
acter of the records and their earmarks of reliability . . . acquired from
their source and origin and the nature of their compilation." This reliance
appears unfounded. The Palmer case involved the admissibility as a busi-
ness entry of a railroad engineer's accident report. Since the primary
utility of such a report was in litigating and not in railroading, the Supreme
Court, under the Act, excluded this self-serving document as not being
made in the regular course of business. But this analogy cannot validly
be applied to hospital records. As the dissenting justice clearly states:
"The business of hospitals is caring for patients. The methods systemat-
ically employed for the conduct of that business include the making of such
records as appellant offered in this case. Proper care of patients would be
impossible without such records. Their primary utility is not in litigat-
ing." 11 As to the question of cross-examination, is there any rational basis
for a distinction (certainly there is none in the Act) between hospital rec-
ords and other business entries? Professor Wigmore strongly advocated
the admissibility of hospital records since, as to them, there is a necessity
sonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing
or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be
shoun to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term
'business' shall include business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind."
(Italics supplied.) The court completely ignores the italicized provision.
5. United States v. Balance, 59 F. (2d) 1040 (App. D. C. 1932). For a case
decided under the Act, see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Saxe, I34 F. (2d) I6 (App. D. C.
1943) (hospital records of diagnosis admitted without objection).
6. The following hospital records of diagnoses have been admitted: Buckminster's
Estate v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 147 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ("cerebral hemor-
rhage") ; Norwood v. Great American Indemnity Co., 146 F. (2d) 797 (C .C. A. 3d,
1944) ("conflicting" autopsy reports) ; Becker v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 171 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1944) ("Psychoneurosis, Hysteria") ; Reed v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America, 123 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 194) ("well under influence of
alcohol") ; Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o),
cert. denied, 313 U. S. 567 (1940) ("clinical records," etc.).
7. Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros., Inc., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. (2d) 224 (1938); Gile
v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N. W. 7o6 (937) ; People v. Kohlmeyer, 284 N. Y.
366, 31 N. E. (ad) 490 (1940) (a case very near in point: diagnosis of "manic de-
pressive insanity"); Conlon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 R. I. 88, 183
Atl. 85o (1936) ("moderately advanced tuberculosis"). See Note (7939) 12o A. L. R.
1124.
8. See McCORMIcK AND RAY, TEXAs LAw OF EViDENcE §§ 632-7. In Paxos v.
Jarka Corporation, 314 Pa. 148, I71 At. 468 (1934) the court propounded a test based
mainly upon the qualifications of the physician making the diagnosis: "such evidence
must be the opinion of a person so qualified as an expert in a field as to be capable of
drawing a sound conclusion concerning a condition not visible but reflected circum-
stantially by the existence of other visible and known symptoms." 314 Pa. at 153-4,
771 Atl. at 471.
9. Instant case at 300.
10. 318 U. S. 109, 114 (i943).
ix. Instant case at 301.
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(calling for direct testimony all the individuals who cooperated in making
the records would greatly hamper hospital operations) and a circum-
stantial guarantee of trustworthiness (such records being relied upon in
matters of life and death) .12 Accordingly, it is felt that the court has gone
far toward nullifying the Act as it applies to hospital records in the District
of Columbia.
Labor Law-State Statute Regulating Labor Unions-Repug-
nancy to National Labor Relations Act-Invoking a statute of
1943,1 Florida enjoined the petitioners from functioning within the state
as a labor union I and business agent of the union until the labor union
complied with a statutory provision for filing an annual report, 8 and the
business agent of the union complied with a provision for securing a
license.4 On certiorari,5 held (two justices dissenting), reversed. Both of
the statutory requirements are repugnant to the Ndtional Labor Relations
Act." Hill v. Florida, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373 (U. S. 1945).
The effect of the decision in the instant case is to invalidate anti-union
legislative provisions similar to those of the Florida statute and existing in
about a dozen states.7 In a previous Supreme Court case," the exercise by
12. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1521, 1522, I53oa; 6 id. § 17o7. For a
general discussion of the problem, see Hale, Hospital Records as Evidence (1941) 14
So. CALIF. L. R.v. 99; Comment (0939) 38 MICH. L. REV. 219.
I. Fla. Laws 1943, C. 21968.
2. United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters of United States
and Canada, Local No. 234. The union was enjoined in connection with employees of
the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co. of Jacksonville, Florida, which had been held to
be engaged in interstate commerce.
3. Section 6 provided: "Every labor organization operating in the State of Florida
shall make a report in writing to the Secretary of State annually on or before July
first. Such report shall be filed by. the secretary or business agent of such labor or-
ganization and shall be in such form as the Secretary of State may prescribe, and shall
show the following facts: (I) The name of the labor organization; (2) The location
of its office; (3) The name and address of its president, secretary and business agent."
Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968, § 6.
4. Section 4 provided: "No person shall be granted a license or a permit to act as
a business agent in the State of Florida, (I) Who has not been a citizen of and has
not resided in the United States of America for a period of more than ten years next
prior to making application for such license or permit. (2) Who has been convicted
of a felony. (3) Who is not a person of good moral character. . .. " Fla. Laws
1943, c. 21968, § 4. A board composed of the Governor, the Secretary of State and the
Superintendent of Education had to pass on the application. Section 14 provided:
"Any person or labor organization who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act,
shall upon conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished
by a fine not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the
county jail for a period not to exceed six months, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment" Ibid.
5. The cases of Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 65 Sup. Ct. 1384
(U. S. '945) and Congress of Industrial Organization v. McAdory, 65 Sup. Ct. 1395
(U. S. 1945) (state court decisions upholding the validity of the Bradford Act of Ala-
bama) were both dismissed on the same day that the instant case was decided for lack
of a justiciable dispute.
6. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (14i). Hereafter called the
Wagner Act.
7. Ala. Acts 1943, No. 298, p. 252; CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 97,
§ 94; Idaho Laws 1943, c. 76; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) c. 44,
§ 802; MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1944) § 17.454; MINN. STAT. (Mason,
Supp. 1944) § 4254; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.7; S. D. Laws 1943,
c. 86; TEx. ANN. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 5154a; WIs. STAT. (943)
§ 111.01.
8. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U. S. 740 (1941). The Wisconsin board ordered that the union cease mass picketing,
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Wisconsin of its police power to regulate disorders growing out of a strike
had been upheld on the ground that the state statute did not conflict with
the Wagner Act. Although the Court struck down a Texas statute 9
requiring labor organizers to secure an organizer's card before soliciting
members because it contravened the constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech and assembly, not until the instant case did the Court squarely
face the question of the repugnancy of a state police regulation to the
Wagner Act. The Federal Act, which has been applied chiefly in cases of
employer-employee disputes, protects the right of collective bargaining not
only against the employer but against the state as well. The Florida
licensing provision was held invalid as contrary to the Congressional pur-
poses embodied in the Federal Act; 10 and while the information-filing pro-
vision did not conflict per se with the Federal Act, the sanctions imposed
created an obstacle to collective bargaining. A minority of the Court 11
took the position that neither provision of the Florida statute was repugnant
to the Federal Act, and therefore the two Acts could coexist 12 since there
was no clear Congressional intent expressed to the contrary. Such an
argument, it is submitted, in the light of the legislative history of the
Wagner Act and the facts of labor-union life,13 is a sacrifice of substance
threatening employees, picketing their domiciles, and obstructing the factory entrances.
"In sum we cannot say that the mere enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
excluded state regulation of the type which Wisconsii has exercised in this case. It
has not been shown that any employee was deprived of rights protected or granted by
the federal act or that the status of any of them under the federal act was impaired."
Id. at 751. See also SkN. RaP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 16. This case
was followed in distinguishable cases however in subsequent lower court and state
court decisions: Border v. Sparks, 54 F. Supp. 300 (M. D. Ala. 1944) (upholding sec-
tion 7 of the Bradford Act) ; American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, z55 P. (2d)
145 (Colo. 1944) (Labor Peace Act not repugnant to Wagner Act). The Court in the
Allen-Bradley case reserved the exact point of the instant case in the words: "If the
order of the state Board affected the status of employees or if it caused a forfeiture of
collective bargaining rights, a distinctly different question would arise." 315 U. S. at
75I. Compare 29 U. S. C. A. § I51 n. io (1942).
9. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (I945). Since a majority of the court did not
agree that the statute was repugnant to the Wagner Act, the decision was not placed on
that ground.
io. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their oun choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
29 U. S. C. § I5I (1941). (Italics supplied.) See Bu loRD, THE WAGNER Acr (1941)
§3.
II. Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissent in which Justice Roberts concurred.
"Specifically, if Congress were to make certain requirements for the filing of reports
by labor organizations that seek to avail themselves of the rights defined by the Wag-
ner Act, and also were to devise a system of identification and licensing of authorized
representatives of the unions, one would be hard put to find anything in the Wagner
Act to prove that it had already dealt with these matters." 65 Sup. Ct. 1373, 1383. But
didn't Congress deal with such matters when it gave "full freedom" to employees re-
garding them?
12. "We agree, that in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of
Congress in a case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the
repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be
reconciled or consistently stand together. . . " Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227,
243 (U. S. 1859). This doctrine has been followed in a long line of cases permitting
coexistence of state and federal laws concerning such matters which Congress could
have regulated, but did not. Maurer v. Hamilton, 3o9 U. S. 598 (1939) ; Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U. S. I (1937).
13. Section 6 provides that all labor organizations "operating" within the state
must make a report. Does this include a nascent union?
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to form. The Wagner Act was passed to bring the bargaining power of
employees up to that of the employer and, by putting the weight of federal
law behind the employees, to maintain an equilibrium which the minority
position might tend to upset. When the controversial issue of the c6nsti-
tutionality of the proposed amendment1 4 to the Florida Constitution pro-
hibiting closed shops is submitted to the Court, it will find that a possible
conflict with the Wagner Act has been avoided by express provision that
its terms shall not be construed to abridge the right of collective bargaining.
War-Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act-Contracts-Plaintiff
and defendant company were parties to a dealership contract, containing
a proviso for termination by defendant company upon sixty days notice.
Plaintiff enlisted in the Army in August, 1942. In January, 1943, while
plaintiff was still in service, defendant company requested his resignation.
Upon plaintiff's refusal, defendant company, later in January, served notice
of intention to terminate, and in April notice of actual termination. Plain-
tiff, retired from the Army, brought this action for relief under the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o. Held, for plaintiff. Defendant
company did not have the legal right to terminate the contract while plain-
tiff was in the military service, and, consequently all of plaintiff's contract
rights and privileges as existing at the time of his enlistment should be
restored. Stockton v. Ford Motor Co., 61 7. Supp. 261 (S. D. Idaho
1945).
The Civil Relief Act suspends, in certain cases, enforcement of civil
liabilities of persons in the military service.' In the instant case no effort
was made to enforce any civil liability against plaintiff. The court admitted
that if any relief is afforded in the Act it is provided by the section pertain-
ing to relief against fines and penalties incurred for failure to perform
obligations. 2 The court reasoned that Congress intended to save military
personnel from injury in their civil affairs during service, that forfeiture is
a penalty by which one loses interests in his property, and that cancellation
of this contract is a forfeiture, and therefore, within the scope of the sec-
14. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 3 C. C. H. T945 Labor Law Serv.
1 62,686.
i. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of Oct. 17, 1940, c. 888, § I, 54 STAT.
1178 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. § 5I0 (App. 1944). The basic philosophy of the Act was
to provide a moratory period for the accrued obligations of soldiers and sailors. The
relief afforded under the 194o Act was limited principally to a stay of court actions,
within the discretion of the court. Amendments, passed in 1942, clarified and strength-
ened the Act but did not change the moratory character of the legislation. See Skilton,
The S6ldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o and the Amendnents of z942
'(1942) 91 U. oF PA. L. R!v. 177; Bridewell, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act, Amendments of x942 (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 797.
2. "If any relief is provided in the Act it is provided by Section 522, U. S. C. A.
Appendix, Title 5o. . . !" Instant case at 264. This section is as follows: "When
an action for compliance with the terms of any contract is stayed pursuant to this Act
no fine or penalty shall accrue by reason of failure to comply with the terms of such
contract during the period of such stay, and in any case where a person fails to per-
form any obligation and a fine or penalty for such nonperformance is incurred a court
may, on such terms as may be just, relieve against the enforcement of such fine or
penalty if it shall appear that the person who would suffer by such fine or penalty was
in the military service when the penalty was incurred and that by reason of such serv-
ice the ability of such person to pay or perform was thereby materially impaired." Act
of Oct. 17, 1940, c. 888, § 202, 54 STAT. 1181 (1940), 5o U. S. C. A. § 522 (App. 1944).
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tion. 3 The token benefit 4 given the plaintiff would hardly seem to warrant
the extreme efforts of the court here to resolve doubts in favor of a return-
ing serviceman." From a patriotic standpoint, the court is to be com-
mended for its efforts to relieve the plaintiff from an apparently non-
commendable course of conduct by the defendant; 6 yet from a legal point
of view, the grave concern everywhere for returning servicemen should
neither be allowed to obstruct the rights of others nor to obscure judicial
appraisement of measures for the servicemen's aid.7
Wills-Construction-Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence-The
testator's will bequeathed to his nephew "all the stock which I may own in
the X corporation" and gave the rest of his estate to a charity. The ques-
tion arose whether the terms of the bequest to his nephew were broad
enough to pass to him not only the shares of X corporation which were
registered in the testator's name, but also other shares of the same corpo-
ration which were owned by a family holding company in which the testa-
tor had a one-third interest, and which were distributed in kind to his
personal representatives upon dissolution of the holding company after
his death. These latter shares were among the assets of the dissolved
corporation. Held (3-2 decision), that the nephew was not entitled to the
shares received from the dissolved holding corporation. Bird v. Wilming-
ton Society of Fine Arts, 43 A. (2d) 476 (Del. 1945).
The case is important because it presents a unique problem in applying
well-established rules of the construction of wills to the equally well-
settled "corporate entity" theory. It is submitted that the majority opinion
is sound. While it is a cardinal rule in the construction of wills that the
3. Instant case at 264. The court's reasoning hinges on synonymity of "forfeiture"
and "penalty." Some distinctions which have been drawn between these words may be
found in 31 WoRDs AND PHRASES (perm. ed. 1940) "Penalty," 6o3-4 and pocket part
(1945) 140.
4. Although the plaintiff's contract is restored there is nothing to prevent the de-
fendant's serving sixty day notice of intent to terminate now. The court recognizesthis possibility at 264-5.
5. The court recognizes that its judgment is questionable. "If any relief is pro-
vided in the Act. . .." Instant case at 264. "The statute itself is somewhat indefi-
nite and there is a serious doubt in the Court's mind that this contract is covered by
it." Ibid. "If the Court is wrong in its judgment, this law should be amended. . ..
Ibid.
6. It is not clear that the defendant is wholly blameworthy. It is stated that plain-
tiff left two managers, who were later called to service themselves, in charge of his
business. Nothing more appears to show whether further provisions for management
or continuance of the business were made. Defendant could hardly be expected to
allow its customers in the area to remain without service, parts, and available rationed
automobiles for an indefinite period; in January, I943, it was indeed indefinite how
long any serviceman might be absent from his business. Negotiations between defend-
ant and plaintiff's competitor to whom the contract was given were carried on without
any notice to plaintiff and it would seem he should have been advised of these dealings.
From the facts of the case as reported it is difficult to evaluate defendant's conduct
7. The court admits that if plaintiff had been in civilian life there would be no fine
or penalty involved but states that they are dealing with plaintiff not as a civilian but
as a soldier, revealing thereby the determinative factor in this case. Instant case at
264. While the action here was for relief under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act and the court clearly states in its opening paragraph that the question presented
is whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief under this Act, there is a considerable
amount of dicta about the meaning of an assurance of cooperation given by defend-
ant to plaintiff prior to his enlistment. There is confusion in the dicta also as evi-
denced by the construction, in one paragraph, of the assurance's constituting a promise
by defendant to waive the right to terminate and in the next paragraph stating there
was no promise but only an implied contract. Instant case at 263.
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intention of the testator must be ascertained and given effect 1 and that
extrinsic evidence should be admitted to show the sense in which the tes-
tator used his words, 2 it is equally true that where the will contains no
ambiguity, it must be construed from its "four corners" according to the
plain sense and meaning of the testator's words, and extrinsic evidence
that the testator intended to say something other than what he did say is
inadmissible.$ Where several species of property more or less fit the
description in the will, but only one answers the description technically
and precisely, the other will not pass. 4  Technically, the phrase "all the
stock which I may own in the X corporation" refers only to the shares of
stock owned by the testator himself and does not include stock owned by
a separate and distinct holding corporation of which he was a shareholder.
Under ordinary circumstances it is generally accepted that a corporation
is an entity, separate and apart frdm the members who compose it. The
corporation, as a distinct legal entity, owns its property in the same sense
as a natural person owns property. The property of the corporation is not
to be regarded as the property of its stockholders. 5 The fault of the dis-
senting opinion arises out of the fact that it would permit the receipt of
extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity which did not exist on the face
of the will. It would then proceed to dissolve that ambiguity by accepting
additional extrinsic evidence as to the testator's intent, though this evidence
would have been admissible only if in fact an equivocation existed.8
i. 69 C. J. (934) §II8; 2 PAGE, WILLS (3d ed. 1941) §gi8 n. I.
2. See also Cahill v. Pilzer, 204 Ky. 644, 648, 265 S. W. 32, 34 (1924) where the
court said, "In construction of wills the intention of the testator, as gathered from the
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